The aim of the laboratory is to provide a scientific methodological apparatus aimed at maintaining information security and protection of modern and advanced devices from side channel attacks, monitoring systems of information security, information security of cloud technologies, distributed systems, multiagent systems.
At the present time identifying devices such as smart cards, bank cards, sim-cards, RFID tags and others are widely used in the whole world and also in Russia. Due to the widespread use of crypto devices, monitoring systems and distributed multiagent systems and identification devices, their safety is a priority direction for modern research vulnerabilities for side channel attacks.
Investigation of attacks on modern and prospective crypto devices, systems, information security monitoring, multi-agent systems and the development of methods and algorithms to improve the reliability of modern devices.
One direction of development of the information security theory is the development of models and methods aimed at detection of potential vulnerabilities of multi-agent systems with decentralized management. The aim is to develop an approach that uses the Markov chains, estimation of a safe condition of multi-agent robotic systems undergoing the processes of informational influence. The possibilities of application of scientific Markov processes for modeling processes of informational influence on a decentralized multi-agent robotic system are investigated. The formula dependences for analytical modeling aimed to obtain probabilistic values of finding the system in safe condition are obtained. An experiment aimed at assessing the state of information security of robotic systems, which are exposed to unauthorized influence, giving the opportunity to compare the data was conducted.
Development of methods and techniques of detection, neutralization and counteraction to side channel attacks
In the last years the number of cryptographic attacks that use the features of implementation and the working environment has sharply increased. Such attacks SCA collect physical information about the work of cryptographic devices and are not considered traditional cryptographic security models.
Protection of cryptosystems from these attacks, at present, is a priority direction of research in the field of cryptography. One way to protect against side-channels attacks is the use error-correcting codes in crypto-devices. This research involves the development of detection methods and techniques, neutralization and counteract to existing side-channel attacks.
Identification of vulnerabilities of modern crypto devices, communication devices, IB monitoring systems that allow to realize the impact on software and algorithms.
Currently, in connection with growth of complexity multi-agent systems a special attention is paid to issues of ensuring information security (IS) of individual devices, elements and their groups. Among many directions of a destructive effect on such systems the least studied attack are the attacks on side channels.
Side channel attacks is a class of attacks aimed at vulnerabilities in the practical implementation of the cryptosystem. In contrast to theoretical cryptanalysis, the attack on third-party channels uses information about physical processes in the device that is not discussed in the theoretical description of a cryptographic algorithm. Such attacks have been known in the 1980-ies, but these became widespread after publication of the results by Paul Kocher in 1996. Information of the side channels is understood as information that can be obtained from the crypto-devices and is not either plaintext or cipher-text.